1) H&H: no unification is explanation, cause explanation involves acquiring new beliefs, whereas unification consists in the systematization of old beliefs.

2) H&H: Explanation is derivation of the explanandum from a background theory and the auxiliary or contextual information.

3) H&H distinguishes between:

i) the construction of theories and the application of theries; it seems that, they consider that the construction of theories is a less explanatory activity.

ii) specified and unspecified

why-questions.

My considerations:

I consider that, philosophy of science should be live at the intersection between intelligibility, rationality, economy, validity and science. Philosophers should treat about the most intelligible scientific notions, to promove a harmony between all special sciences, and increase the compatibility between philosophy and science.

That is why, I dont like too much diverse, but I like to refine some scientific articles. The more we fall in philosophical distinctions and beliefs, the more we move off science. The more we fall in scientific details, the more we remove of philosophy...and can no more master the scientific diverse.

Now, I consider, from above, that, H&H' bacground theory is, from a cognitive criterion, a special universality or generality (but only a causal one).

Similarily, I consider that, the so called initial conditions or auxiliary information are/is an information that mediates the subsumption and

connection between

the universality and explanandum.

That is, H&H'explanation is also subsumptory.

But the subsumption of many individual cases under a universality (either causal or non-causal) is unificatory, clasificatory...

That the construction of a theory as a response to a why-question is less explanatory, it seems to me too artificial, less important, less true, too sofisticated.

We have both general explanations

and particular and individual explanations.

Deduction implies subsumption.

The intermediar information mediates a subsumption. Subsumption is unificatory.

But, the universality, at least when the explanandum is about a natural fact,

should be causaly reconstructed, I consider.

H&H:..."explanation thus involves acquiring new beliefs"...

Consider the following case:

Universality:The erosion of telomere ends causes replicative senescence (Tarazona et al. 2002).

Explanandum: an individual cell undergoes replicative senescence.

Now, what so new discoveries implies this explanation? The trivial fact that the individual cell has losed its telomere ends...

...Explanation is an inference from a background theory...

There are cases in which the event that we want to explain represent a very

complex effect of many (both unidirectional and bidirectional)

causal chains (e.g., human aging). In gerontology there are hundreds of causal scientific theories which explain conjunctively aging, not a single background theory, though all events can be explanated regresively until to the most fundamental theory of the universe.

Local Conclusion:

Between the representations

that explain and the representation of the natural fact which we want to explain should be a logical relation (e.g., derivation or deduction).

BUT, THE REPRESENTATIONS

THAT EXPLAIN SHOULD

REPRESENT ALSO THE CAUSE/CAUSES

AND THE EXPLANANDUM SHOULD REPRESENT AN EFFECT.

In the previous exemple, the universality represents a causal relation, the auxiliary information represents

the cause, and the explanandum represents the effect.

The relation between the succession of representation that compose the explanatory process is logical, but the relation between the natural facts that are representated is causal.

The logical relation is not necesarily causal: If A and B are concepts

and A->B, then this thus not mean that A causes B, but B is contained in A or is equiintensional or equiextensional with A, syncronously. But a representation of a logical relation is an effect of a cause.

When the domain of explanation is mathematics, the principles will be mathemathical. But, mathematics it seems to me that is no so ...explanatory science. But at the meta level the structure of mathematical explanation will be logical. For instance, somebody can ask why (m+n)^2=m^2+2mn+n^2.

Universality1:

" x" y (x+y)^2=(x+y)(x+y).

Universality2:

" x" y(x+y)(x+y)=x(x+y)+y(x+y).

Universality3:

" x" y x(x+y)=xx+xy.

" x" y y(x+y)=yx+yy.

From U1, U2, U3 results that (x+y)^2=xx+xy+yx+yy

U4: " x" y xy=yx.

From U1, U2, U3, and U4 results that, (x+y)^2=xx+2xy+yy.

U5: " x" y xx=x^2, yy=y^2.

From U1, U2, U3, U4, and U5 results that, " x" y (x+y)^2=x^2+2xy+y^2.

Auxiliary information:x=m and y=n.

Explanandum:(m+n)^2=m^2+2mn

+n^2.

However, many, if not most time, time in mathematics we should find some results, not to find answers to why questions. The metastructure of the mathematical explanation is logical, whereas the cognitive infrastructure of representations that compose the explanation is mathematical.

Subsumation, unification, derivation, universality still remain. However, every mathematical representation of the previous human

explanation is also an effect. Every neural representation is an EFFECT.

A NEURAL REPRESENTATION CAN BE FALSE BUT NOT IREAL, UNCAUSAL.

LAW:EVERY POSSIBLE EXPLANATION SHOULD BE BOTH CAUSAL AND LOGIC.

MULTIPLE REALISABILITY IS UNDER CAUSALITY.

MIND IS UNDER CAUSALITY

WITHOUT CAUSALITY, THERE CAN BE NO LOGIC.

LOGIC IS AN EFFECT.

CAUSALITY IS NOT AN EFFECT OF LOGIC.

LOGIC IMPLIES CAUSALITY.

THE FORMS OF CONCEPTS, PROPOSITIONS, AND THE LANGUAGE ITSELF ARE EFFECTS...

THOUGH THAT THE RELATIONS BETWEEN FORMS IS NO CAUSAL, THEY ALL ARE EFFECTS...

Reference:

Erik Weber and Maarten Van Dyck:1999, EXPLANATION AS UNIFICATION, SYNTHESE.

A LITTLE PROGRESS IN TRUTH

1.Every time is successional.

2.Every succession is temporal.

3.Not every succession is in itself causal.

4.Not every time is in itself causal.

5.Every process is temporal.

6.Not every process is causal. (from 5 and 4).

For instance, suposse that we have three independent but "equitemporal"

causal chains or lines:

A causes B causes C

A' causes B' causes C'

A"causes B"causes C"

t1 t2 t3

Now, the succesion A, B', C" is temporal, as every succession, but is not causal, cause neither A causes B' nor B' causes C".

Similarily, the conscious flux is succesional and thereby temporal, but not necessarily causal.

For instance, at t1 we can see a red light and at t2 we can see a blue light, because a difference in the stimuli with which interacted our visual systems at the two different time points.

This is the truth, though that some philosophers(e.g., Loyd) it seems that consider that every conscious point in the conscious flux is determinated by the previous one...

However, what I said yesterday remains valide at the global level.

Every point in the conscious flux is effect, but its cause is not necessarily a point the conscious flux.

At the global level of the universe, in the limits in which it changes, time is causal. Everey change is effect. Every change implies a causal succesion. Some processes can be causal... m5x12xs